The agreement was also attacked because of its lack of respect and the perceived preference of some nations. The Council of Ministers would never have considered imposing sanctions on France or Germany, both of which had exceeded the 3% deficit threshold in 2003. On the other hand, other countries, such as Portugal and Greece, have been threatened in the past with heavy penalties. Our work has analysed the behaviour of the main players. The governments of the Member States, the German and French ministries of finance, the Bundesbank, the Monetary Committee, the Commission, the European Parliament and some non-comedian experts such as academics and researchers working in the research departments of central banks, the IMF, the OECD, etc. We assume that governments have the highest resources. In addition to them, there are other players who participate in the „game.“ It should be noted that in November 1995, the positions of the Stability and Growth Pact were fairly dispersed. The positions were similar to those of the Bundesbank and the „Monetarites“ of the German and French finance ministries. The reason is, in our view, that it has been understood that the Stability and Growth Pact should institutionalise the German model which, in the end, had the support of a higher negotiating position. We stress the importance of common ideas and convictions among experts on the budgetary regime requested by EMU. But these ideas alone were not enough to reach agreement on the Stability and Growth Pact. Ultimately, power politics is essential to understanding the end result.
In other words, it could be said that a number of general convictions were a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. The sufficient condition was the simultaneous existence of convictions, as well as a constellation of powers. This attitude was generated by Germany`s strong position (due to its exceptional position in the field of monetary integration). The Franco-German exchanges (institutionalized in the 1963 ElysĂ©e Treaty) correspond, on several levels, to a subgroup of negotiations on the European scene. Its most important function is to drastically reduce the number of negotiators involved, which exponentially reduces the transaction costs of an agreement, which exponentially increases the chances of reaching a compromise solution. We believe that these summits are important because France and Germany not only have different perspectives on these issues, but also groups of different countries. As with other types of negotiations, it is as if France and Germany were „delegated“ to negotiate an agreement. [21] Often the real solution has not been found at Franco-German summits or economic consultations, but the meetings that followed on the European scene have benefited from previous exchanges of opinions and signals.
The graph below provides an overview of the key players, grouped according to their initial resources and directions, when Waigel presented its proposal in November 1995, as well as the convergence that followed. The horizontal axis shows its political-ideological preferences for or against strict rules on budgetary discipline, while the vertical dimension shows its power resources and decision-making capacity.