The agreements recognized the „legitimate rights of the Palestinian people“ and a process had to be put in place within five years to ensure the full autonomy of the people. BĂ©gin insisted on the adjective „full“ to ensure that it was the maximum political right that was achievable. This total autonomy should be discussed with the participation of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza was agreed after the election of an autonomous authority to replace the Israeli military government. [2] The agreements did not mention the Golan Heights, Syria or Lebanon. It was not the global peace that Kissinger, Ford, Carter or Sadat had in mind during the previous change of THE American presidency. [18] It was less clear than the Sinai agreements and was then interpreted differently by Israel, Egypt and the United States. The fate of Jerusalem was knowingly excluded from this agreement. [19] Discussions focused on a number of topics, including the future of Israeli settlements and air bases in Sinai, but it was Gaza and the West Bank that continued to be the greatest challenges. In particular, delegations disagreed on the applicability of UN Security Council Resolution 242 to a long-term agreement in the territories, as well as on the status of Israeli settlements during the planned negotiations on Palestinian autonomy following a peace treaty. In the end, the summit did not result in a formal peace agreement, but it successfully established the basis for an Egypt-Israeli peace in the form of two „framework documents“ that defined the principles of a bilateral peace agreement and a formula for Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank. And there were some discreet signs of willingness to engage with Washington: Arafat, according to egypt`s military intelligence chief, „does not trust President Sadat and would prefer to speak directly to the United States on the issue of Middle East peace and the role of the PLO.“ At the time, there was no American contact with what was officially considered a terrorist organization.
Israel maintained this position until the Oslo Accords in 1993. Two other important lessons are less tangible. Camp David needed a remarkable guided tour of Sadat, Begin and Carter. Sadat took enormous political risks – which ended up costing him his life – by negotiating with Israel.